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Abstract
Like any regulatory effort, private transnational standard-setters need to legitimate themselves to the audiences from
which they seek support or obedience. While early scholarship on private transnational governance has emphasized the
centrality of democratic legitimation narratives in rendering private governance socially acceptable, evidence from more
recent standard-setting schemes suggests a declining relevance of that narrative over time. In my analysis of private sus-
tainability regulation, I identify a combination of two factors that jointly contribute to this diminished role of democratic
legitimation. First, private transnational governance has become a pervasive phenomenon. This means that new entrants
to the field no longer face the same liability of newness that required first movers to make an extra effort in legitimation.
Second, private standard-setting has moved from areas characterized by ‘governance gaps’ to areas in which meaningful
intergovernmental regulation already exists. In these areas, however, the ‘state prerogative’ in legitimating governance
holds. As a result, transnational standard-setters rely not so much on stressing their democratic credentials, but instead
emphasize their contribution to achieving internationally agreed goals.
Keywords
democracy; global governance; legitimacy; private regulation; sustainability standards
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Legitimization of Private and Public Regulation: Past and Present”, edited by Klaus Dieter
Wolf (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany), Peter Collin (Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, Ger-
many) and Melanie Coni-Zimmer (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany).
© 2017 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
In the 1990s, private transnational regulation was the
proverbial new kid on the block. Observers saw world
politics at a ‘bifurcation’, as the state-centric world of
world politics was increasingly complemented, if not re-
placed, by a ‘multi-centric’ world of world politics in
which private actors carved out spheres of authority for
often very specific issues (Biersteker & Hall, 2002; Cutler,
Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Haufler, 1993; Rosenau, 1990,
1995; Wapner, 1995).
In the field of sustainability governance, the pro-
liferation of private transnational governance was par-
ticularly pronounced. While the CERES Principles set
a code for the environmental conduct of companies,
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) developed criteria
geared to harmonize corporate reporting on environ-
mental performance. Elsewhere, the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) set standards for sustainable management
of forests—an approach which the Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC) soon copied for fisheries—and the World
Commission on Dams (WCD) developed social and envi-
ronmental guidelines for the international financing of
large dams (Auld, 2014; Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004;
Dingwerth, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Pattberg, 2007).
Beyond the sustainability field, Fairtrade Labelling Orga-
nizations International and Utz Certified established fair
trade standards while a wealth of initiatives developed
and promoted fair labour standards for the textiles in-
dustry. Finally, in the new field of Internet governance,
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a private organization like the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers became a key regulator;
and even in international security, private companies
offering security and military services had come to en-
gage in meaningful self-regulation across borders (Krah-
mann, 2017).
Taken together, these developments suggested that
private transnational regulation had moved significantly
beyond its traditional confines of the transnational
merchant rules—the lex mercatoria—and global sports
governance—the lex sportiva (Wolf, 2017)—to become
a key part of ‘global governance’ (Dingwerth & Pattberg,
2006; Rosenau, 1995; Whitman, 2009). But how had it
been possible for private regulators to gain—and subse-
quently maintain—the legitimacy they required to ‘gov-
ern through markets’ (Cashore et al., 2004)? Early schol-
arship had argued that, in the absence of a formal man-
date to regulate ‘for the rest of us’ (Lipschutz & Fogel,
2002), private regulators primarily relied on a democratic
narrative (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Dingwerth, 2007).
Regulators argued that, in developing new regulation, all
relevant stakeholders had been included in transparent
and open decision-making processes.
In this article, I argue that the democratic narra-
tive has lost some of its centrality in the legitimation
of transnational governance over time. I define legitima-
tion as a discursive practice in which actors exchange
arguments to justify their support of, or challenge to,
an institution or its activities. Democratic legitimation
then constitutes the justification or critique of institu-
tions based on values that are commonly associated
with the democratic process. Based on my own previ-
ous work (Dingwerth, 2007, pp. 12–36), I take the lat-
ter to include the values of inclusiveness, participation,
representation and responsiveness (participatory dimen-
sion); transparency and accountability (democratic con-
trol dimension); as well as the values of sincere deliber-
ation and discursive openness (deliberative dimension).
Taken together, the observation that democratic legit-
imation has declined in relevance in private transna-
tional self-regulation stands in marked contrast to the
rise of democratic norms in intergovernmental gover-
nance (Grigorescu, 2015). To account for the relative de-
cline of the democratic legitimation narrative, I focus on
two contributing factors.
First, a closer look at the legitimation of transnational
governance reveals that the choice of legitimation strate-
gies is closely linked to the presence or absence of state
regulation. In fields characterized by ‘governance gaps’,
private regulators strongly rely on democratic legitima-
tion narratives. Where intergovernmental regulation ex-
ists, private regulators primarily seek to show how their
work contributes to the goals set by public regulation. As
a result, democratic legitimation is less central.
Second, even in fields with low levels of intergovern-
mental regulation, late entrants to the field face lower
legitimation pressures than the first private regulators
in the 1990s. Given the ‘liability of newness’ (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984), the latter had to make an extra effort
to legitimate themselves, and they largely answered this
need by stressing their democratic credentials. Once pri-
vate regulation had become more widely recognized as
a legitimate field of global governance and once its role
within the broader landscapeof global governance largely
was taken for granted, legitimation pressures weakened
and democratic legitimation became less central.
2. Legitimating Transnational Regulation
In the following, I reconstruct the legitimation of pri-
vate rule-making in the field of global sustainability gov-
ernance in three steps. I distinguish between an early
phase in which private regulation was a relatively novel
phenomenon (‘Emergence’), a second stage in which it
had become widely recognized as an increasingly ‘nor-
mal’ element of global sustainability governance (‘Evolu-
tion’), and a third phase in which it reached out to neigh-
bouring issue areas (‘Expansion’). Democratic legitima-
tion frames, I argue, have played a major role in the first
phase, but not necessarily in the second and third.
2.1. Emergence
In global sustainability governance, transnational stan-
dard systems have initially emerged in the 1970s, diver-
sified in the 1990s and spread ever since then (Green,
2014, pp. 78–103). They now cover a variety of resources
as well as cross-cutting issues such as environmental
reporting, environmental management systems or so-
cial accountability. The FSC thus defines what counts as
sustainable wood, the MSC provides the same service
for wild-catch fish, Bonsucro for sustainable sugarcane,
and the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO),
the Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) and many
others for additional renewable and non-renewable re-
sources. Add a number of standards on greenhouse gas
accounting, offsetting andmanagement, on fair trade, on
mining or on corporate conduct in the textiles industry
and you will still only get a very rough idea about the
breadth, depth and diversity in contemporary transna-
tional regulation.
So what role do democratic norms play in the legit-
imation of transnational standard schemes in this issue
area? The short answer is that they constitute one impor-
tant legitimation resource alongwith the rule of law, con-
tinued progress and a contribution to problem-solving.
The long answer is more complex. It points to different
roles democratic norms and values play in relation to the
distinct tasks of gaining and maintaining the legitimacy
of transnational organizations, to the institutional em-
bedding of transnational regulation in intergovernmen-
tal regimes, and to the influence the legitimation cul-
tures prevailing in different policy fields may exert on the
strength of democratic values.
Let us look at the short answer first. Here, the no-
tion that a contribution to problem-solving—or effective-
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ness—is a necessary ingredient for successful claims to
legitimacy is straightforward. At least in the environmen-
tal sustainability field, many transnational governance
schemes thus emerged in the 1990s and 2000s on is-
sues which governments had either sought but failed
to regulate or not even sought to regulate in the first
place. Set against this background, the fact that a transna-
tional governance organization achieved at least some-
thing could be seen—and sold—as a success. The argu-
ment is thus one of responding to ‘governance gaps’. Its
common form would be that, if more and more compa-
nies procured wood or wood products and wild catch
fish from sources certified as sustainable by the FSC and
MSC, some trees and some fish stocks will be saved and
some harmwill therefore be prevented in comparison to
a counterfactual world in which the FSC or MSC did not
exist. Similarly, if the GRI manages to lure firms into reg-
ularly disclosing information about their environmental
and human rights footprints, pressures to minimize such
footprints are assumed to mount in the future, whether
through consumer demands or investors’ choices; and if
decisions about large dams follow the guidelines devel-
oped by theWCDand include, for instance, sound impact
assessments as well as the prior informed consent of in-
digenous groups affected by a project, we can continue
to promote hydropower without repeating the mistakes
made in the past.
Yet if effectiveness were the exclusive source of legit-
imation, most transnational governance schemes would
standon shaky ground.On theonehand, their actual con-
tribution to problem-solvingmay either be unknownor—
more likely—remain fairly modest. It may thus be true
that the FSC or the GRI embody ‘good ideas’. But if the
FSC cannot help to significantly slow-down or even halt
deforestation and if the GRI cannot help to make busi-
nesses truly environment-friendly and socially responsi-
ble, the organizations becomeopen to a ‘fig-leaf’ critique
according to which the commitment to transnational
governance schemes simply allows firms or entire indus-
tries to ‘greenwash’ while continuing business as usual.
As a result, continued progress becomes an important
legitimation resource; it shows up in the growth rates
which transnational schemes routinely stress in their an-
nual reports, but also in concerns that further progress
may be difficult to achieve once the ‘low-hanging fruit’
has been harvested. As the umbrella organization of the
sustainability standards movement, the ISEAL Alliance,
for instance, organized its 2012 Annual Conference un-
der the label ‘Beyond the 10 Percent’, pointing to what
many of its member organizations at the time perceived
as a ceiling for their world market shares.
On the other hand, even if their effectiveness re-
mains low, transnational governance schemes constitute
regulatory interventions in markets. They publicly rec-
ognize and reward—sometimes in the form of a label,
sometimes in other forms—the efforts of some market
actors, but not of others. As they create value in this way,
legal certainty becomes another relevant legitimation re-
source: firms that are not rewardedmust be able to know
why and firms that are awarded must be shown to be in
compliance with the rules laid down by a transnational
governance scheme. The effect of this demand is an insti-
tutionalization and a legalization of transnational gover-
nance schemes which encompasses decision-making as
well as implementation. The former includes the legisla-
tive function of establishing or amending the principles
and criteria according to which the scheme distinguishes
between thosewho are rewarded and thosewho are not,
and the constitutional function of establishing or amend-
ing the rules of procedure for the governance scheme
as a whole. What usually results then, are more or less
full-fledged ‘private regimes’ (Haufler, 1993) that are, in
important ways, modelled on the form and function of
intergovernmental regimes.
Finally, the legislative function which transnational
governance schemes adopt by devising ‘rules for the
world’ raises the question who has mandated them to
do so. This, in turn, makes references to democratic
norms and values a fourth pillar of legitimacy claims. In
short, those representing the schemes thus tend to ar-
gue that their organizations are designed so as to maxi-
mize the inclusion of affected ‘stakeholder groups’, the
transparency of the decision-making process and the
possibility for mutual learning in deliberative forums.
To lend credibility to such claims, many organizations
formally or informally divide seats in executive boards
along the lines of pre-defined stakeholder groups, estab-
lish consultative stakeholder forums and allow for public
comments periods when proposing new or amending ex-
isting regulations (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Brassett,
Richardson, & Smith, 2012; Dingwerth, 2007; Dingwerth
& Pattberg, 2009).
Yet the reasons for adding this fourth pillar may be
less obvious than for the first three legitimacy claims and
hence require some further elaboration. Should a ‘gov-
ernance gap’—either alone or in combination with evi-
dence for continued progress in addressing it and legal
certainty for those who comply with a standard—not be
a sufficiently powerful source of legitimation that ren-
ders the need for democratic legitimation less urgent,
if not altogether obsolete; and if it is not, where does
the demand for democratic legitimation arise from? I ar-
gue that it emerges for two reasons. First, even where a
‘governance gap’ is successfully constructed, it often re-
mains contested. Industrialized nationsmay have argued
for an international forest agreement; but the nations on
whose territories much of the world’s remaining forests
are located identify the issue as being firmly within the
boundaries of their national sovereignty. As a result, they
reject the argument that a ‘governance gap’ actually ex-
ists (van Dam, 2002). Second, even if all or most relevant
players were to agree that an issue demands regulation
across borders, it may be far from clear who ought to reg-
ulate; and since the eventual choice of a regulator is likely
to benefit some while putting others at a disadvantage,
it will normally be contested (Benvenisti & Downs, 2007).
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In response to both objections—is there really a gover-
nance gap, and if so, why should we allow this specific
organization to respond to it?—, a solid response to the
question why a specific organization is selected as a reg-
ulator becomes a central legitimation challenge. This is
even more important where private transnational regu-
lators are self-mandated.
While listing the four pillarsmight suggest a fairly sim-
ple and coherent legitimation process inwhich the ability
to crediblymake and defend four distinct claims is all one
needs to be able to regulate, a closer look—as usual—
reveals that the actual dynamics are a bit more complex.
As a first context, gaining and maintaining legiti-
macy are thus distinct tasks transnational governance
organizations confront, and democratic norms tend to
matter differently at each stage. The argument I pre-
sented above is thus primarily linked to the need to gain
legitimacy. Organizations like the FSC or the WCD con-
stituted civil society organizations (CSOs) of a new kind
(Wapner, 1995). They neither advocated for new inter-
governmental norms, nor did they monitor compliance
with existing rules. Instead, they sought to create new
rules, hence embodying what Jessica Green (2014) has
termed ‘entrepreneurial’ rather than ‘delegated author-
ity’. Yet to the extent that they engaged in this function—
that they sought to ‘regulate for the rest of us’ (Lip-
schutz & Fogel, 2002)—it seemed only fair to demand
that they conform to democratic principles. In contrast,
had they limited their operations to themore traditional
CSO turf, the same demand would have been much less
compelling. Meeting the ‘traditional’ standards for ad-
vocacy NGOs would have been sufficient in this case
(van Rooy, 2004).
But since organizations like the FSC were of a new
kind and since they described the need for their emer-
gence as resulting from the failure of intergovernmen-
tal agreements to halt deforestation, they needed a ba-
sis on which to claim legitimacy. Copying standard fea-
tures of international institutions was one part of the so-
lution. The FSC thus defined membership rules and cate-
gories, designated the general assembly of members as
the highest decision-making body and designed the Prin-
ciples and Criteria on which certification in a way that
resembled an international legal document. In addition,
the democratic quality of the decision-making process
featured prominently in statements that sought to jus-
tify the license to regulate which FSC members had arro-
gated to themselves.
In addition to strategy, identity was relevant, too. In
the FSC case, founding members thus had a background
as grassroots environmentalists, and many of them val-
ued democratic norms not only as a strategic resource
but also saw them as appropriate from a normative point
of view. At the same time, organizations that emerged
after the FSC faced strong incentives to follow the same
path whether or not they shared the same persuasions.
On the one hand, funding for new initiatives was easier
to obtain if one could argue to build on the FSC model
that was field-tested and widely seen as a success (Bart-
ley, 2007). On the other hand, theWWF became a major
partner in several initiatives, thereby facilitating isomor-
phism within an emerging organizational field.
Over time, as more and more standard-setters fol-
lowed the FSC template, a standard model from which
others could deviate only at their own risk evolved (Bern-
stein & Cashore, 2007; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009).
With the establishment of the ISEAL Alliance as an um-
brella organization of transnational standard-setters in
2002 and the Alliance’s adoption of the Code of Good
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards
in 2004, this standard model was eventually codified. As
Table 1 shows, it included a number of criteria that are
closely linked to democratic values. Besides their func-
tional role and their perception as ‘appropriate’ by some
of the initiatives themselves, the inclusion of these crite-
ria was also promoted by international trade law where
the World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade stipulated criteria which ‘international
standards’ had to fulfil in order to be compatible with
world trade law (Bernstein, 2011, p. 38).
The adoption of the Code of Good Practice for Setting
Social and Environmental Standards in 2004 signals the
maturation of the organizational field. At the same time,
it also marks an important change in the function demo-
cratic legitimation came to play as the field matured.
While democratic legitimation had initially served to es-
tablish legitimacy for a new type of organization as such,
its function now shifted to distinction, notably between
the more and the less ‘credible’ actors in the field. The
organizations that originally made up the field thus used
theCode ofGoodPracticeno longer to claim that transna-
tional standard systems could be legitimate—that claim
had been widely accepted in the meantime—but rather
to draw a boundary between their own standard systems
and competing initiatives which, they argued, did not
(yet) deserve the same level of ‘credibility’.
As the ISEAL Alliance expanded from the eight mem-
bers which made up its ranks for most of the early years
to twenty-two full members, it further expanded its in-
struments of distinction. Notably, it added an Impacts
Code (in 2010) and an Assurance Code (in 2012) with
which all members need to comply. The former requires
members to systematically monitor and evaluate the
short-term and long-term impacts of their standard sys-
tems. The latter formulates minimum requirements in
areas such as rigor, consistency, competence, impartial-
ity or transparency that member organizations need to
meet in assuring compliancewith social and environmen-
tal standards. Expanding the range of codes thus implies
an extension of the list of legitimacy requirements to
which ISEAL members are subjected. But at the same
time, it also means that democratic decision-making is
no longer an exclusive basis for legitimacy. Instead, it has
become one among several normative frames that con-
stitute the ‘gold standard’ of legitimate private regula-
tion as formulated by the ISEAL Alliance.
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Table 1. References to democratic decision-making norms in the ISEAL Code. Source: ISEAL (2014).
Clause Requirement (or aspirational good practice) Democratic value
4.1 Documented procedures for the process under which each standard is
developed or revised shall: a) form the basis of the standard-setting process; and
b) shall be made available to stakeholders, at a minimum through the
organization’s website.
Transparency
Accountability
5.2.1 At the outset of a standards development or revision process, the
standard-setting organisation shall develop or update lists of sectors that have an
interest in the standard and key stakeholder groups within those sectors, based
on the standard’s scope and its social, environmental and economic outcomes.
Inclusiveness
5.2.2 The standard-setting organisation shall: a) seek to achieve representative
participation in its standard-setting activities. (aspirational good practice)
Representation
Participation
5.4.1 The public consultation phase for standards development or revision shall
include at least one round of 60 days for comment submissions by
stakeholders….For new standards development, a second round of consultation
of at least 30 days shall be included.
Inclusiveness
Transparency
5.4.2 The standard-setting organization shall ensure that participation in the
consultation process: a) is open to all stakeholders; and b) aims to achieve a
balance of interests in the subject matter and in the geographic scope to which
the standard applies.
Inclusiveness
5.4.3 The standard-setting organisation shall provide stakeholders with appropriate
opportunities to contribute to the development or revision of a standard.
Participation
5.4.4 The standard-setting organisation shall: a) identify stakeholder groups that are
not adequately represented; and b) proactively seek their contributions. This
shall include addressing constraints faced by disadvantaged stakeholders.
Representation
Inclusiveness
5.4.6 The standard-setting organisation shall make original comments received during
a consultation period publicly available. (aspirational good practice)
Transparency
5.6.1 Participation in governance bodies making decisions on the content of the
standard shall: a) be open to all stakeholders; and b) shall be constituted by a
reasonable balance of those stakeholders, including those that are directly
affected.
Representation
Inclusiveness
5.6.3 The standard-setting organisation shall: a) strive for consensus on decisions on
the content of the standard; b) define criteria in advance to determine when
alternative decision-making procedures should come into effect, in the event
that consensus cannot be achieved; and c) define what the decision-making
thresholds will be. Those thresholds shall ensure that no one stakeholder group
or type can control decision-making.
Deliberation
(Balanced) Representation
Transparency
Accountability
2.2. Evolution
In a way, the decline of democratic legitimation frames
is thus a function of the maturity of the field. While first
movers like the FSC needed to show how ‘democratic’
they were in order to be accepted as a new, but nonethe-
less legitimate form of global governance, their success
in doing so means that private governance has, over the
course of two decades, become a widely recognized ‘pil-
lar’ of contemporary global governance. The implication
is that existing regulators spend, relatively speaking, less
effort on demonstrating their democratic quality. More-
over, new entrants to the field can be expected to also
rely less on a democratic legitimation narrative and to
emphasize performance and assurance instead.
In terms of new entrants, the RSPO, the RTRS, the
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) and Bonsucro can serve as
examples. With the exception of the RTRS, all are mem-
bers of the ISEAL Alliance. Moreover, all four engage in
the certification of agricultural goods or food commodi-
ties, thus distinguishing the initiatives from other ISEAL
members like Equitable Origin that certifies gas and oil
exploration and production, the Golf Environment Orga-
nization that certifies sustainable golf courses or Good-
Weave that offers a label for carpets and rugs free from
exploitative production.
Sowhat role does democratic legitimation play in the
more recent initiatives? Existing studies of the RSPO and
RTRS suggest that democratic legitimation is relevant in
the sense that the organizations identify themselves as
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‘multi-stakeholder initiatives’ that represent all relevant
sectors in the supply chain for the respective commod-
ity. At the same time, they show that both organizations
have difficulties to become fully representative of the
diversity of interests in their respective fields, thereby
putting an inherent limit to the extent to which the or-
ganizations can use a democratic narrative as a basis for
building their legitimacy (Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011;
Schouten, Leroy, & Glasbergen, 2012). As a result, they
seek to demonstrate their strength elsewhere, notably
in the claim that the volumes of certification rise fast and
steady. Moreover, since public contestation of the RSPO
mainly revolves around the credibility of the environmen-
tal claims of certificate-holders, the organization also em-
phasizes credibility issues in its external communication
(Nikoloyuk, Burns, & de Man, 2010, pp. 68–69).
Again, in particular the performance claim is one that
all standard systems make, so the difference is primar-
ily in the emphasis placed on either performance or pro-
cedures. Informing about the representative nature of
the initiative, the RSPOwebsite for instance simply states
that it ‘unites stakeholders from the 7 sectors of the
palm oil industry’ and that it counts ‘more than 2,500
members worldwide who represent all links along the
palm oil supply chain’ (RSPO, 2016). Similarly, the BCI
informs that ‘to achieve [its] mission, BCI works with a
diverse range of stakeholders across the cotton supply
chain to promote measurable and continuing improve-
ments for the environment, farming communities and
the economies of cotton-producing areas’ (BCI, 2016);
and Bonsucro stipulates that it ‘builds a platform to ac-
celerate change for the largest agricultural commodity in
the world—sugarcane’ (Bonsucro, 2016). This is different
from the stronger statement of the FSC,which claims that
‘to make sure no one viewpoint dominates the others,
our membership has three chambers—environmental,
social and economic—that have equal rights in decision-
making’ (FSC, 2016a, emphasis in the original).
A very similar picture is obtained by examining the
Public System Reports (PSR) that ISEAL members are
asked to update and submit annually for each of the
three ISEAL Codes. Looking at the Standards Code, the
FSC report is not only significantly more detailed and
more comprehensive; it also puts a stronger emphasis on
the organization’s identity as a representative ‘member-
ship organization’ (FSC, 2016b). What is relatively easy
to spot, thus, is that new entrants pay less attention to
democratic legitimation than the ‘first movers’. The sec-
ond expectationwhich holds that the ‘firstmovers’ them-
selves will reduce the role that the democratic narrative
plays in their efforts to claim legitimacy over time, is
more difficult to ascertain based on the PSR documents
publishedby the ISEALAlliance. TheMSC, for instance, re-
ports more comprehensively about the inclusiveness of
its decision-making procedures than many of the more
recent initiatives (MSC, 2015). Thismight suggest that so-
cialization into the norms of the (early) field is stronger
than expected—an idea that warrants further scrutiny.
2.3. Expansion
The previous section has mainly dealt with the fact that
private transnational governance has become a perva-
sive and hence more common phenomenon in the field
of natural resource governance. Yet private regulation
has also expanded beyond that field, most notably so in
the area of climate governance. The data Jessica Green
has gathered for her book Rethinking Private Author-
ity is particularly telling in this regard. Having collected
information on 119 private environmental regulations
from 1950 to 2009, Green notes that 107 of these have
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. Organizing the initia-
tives along 16 different sectors, she further notes that
‘the carbon sector, which is the youngest at only eleven
years, has the largest number of certification schemes’.
It accounts for a total of 24 initiatives, ‘a full 3 standard
deviations above the mean’ (Green, 2014, p. 96).
What this tells us is that carbon standards—which
roughly fall into carbon accounting, carbon reporting and
disclosure, carbon performance and carbon offsetting—
have been able to build on the success of private transna-
tional governance in the field of sustainable resources
and transfer some of the basic ideas, designs and expe-
riences to a new sector (Abbott, 2012a; Andonova, Bet-
sill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Dingwerth & Green, 2015). At the
same time, the initiatives we find in the carbon sector dif-
fer in two important ways. First, they include the by far
smallest share of de novo regulations among all sectors—
17 per cent, while the share among all 119 initiatives
is 53 per cent. De novo regulations, according to Green
(2014, pp. 89–95), are ‘entirely new’ sets of rules while
amended regulations ‘appropriate some aspects’ of exist-
ing regulations. Second, they tend to be geared towards
contributing either to the broader goals set in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol or to specific articles of
these legal agreements.
In her qualitative reconstruction of the emergence
of the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol, Green (2014,
pp. 132–162) demonstrates how this regulation for car-
bon accounting was initiated by two private actors, the
World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). At the
same time, it was strongly nested in the regulations of
the Kyoto Protocol. The latter had made the prospect of
a carbon-restricted world more likely and thereby raised
the demand for carbon accounting at the national, the
corporate and the project level. As Green (2014, p. 161)
argues, theGHGProtocol became the focal institution for
carbon accounting because there was a strong demand
for its services and ‘because at the time there was no
organization—public or private—with the expertise to
fulfil the same role’. Green acknowledges that ‘the trans-
parency of the rule-making process and the willingness
by WRI and WBCSD to include all interested parties en-
dowed the process and, eventually, the rules with a high
level of legitimacy’ (Green, 2014, p. 162). Yet the nest-
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ing of the GHG Protocol in public intergovernmental reg-
ulation meant that legitimation itself was focused on ex-
pertise and technical know-how rather than on a demo-
cratic narrative. Private regulation did not face a need to
legitimate its broader goals since these were, quite sim-
ply, meant to contribute to the goals that governments
around the world had agreed upon.
A second case study of the Clean DevelopmentMech-
anism (CDM) further illustrates how private transna-
tional regulation is sometimes not as private as the la-
bel suggests and that ‘delegated authority’ is equally im-
portant as ‘entrepreneurial authority’. In some instances,
notably when an issue area is characterized by a strong
focal organization, that focal organization—in the CDM
case, this is theUNFCCC Secretariat—may find it useful to
delegate the task of specifying standards that help to im-
plement specific legal provisions to private actors (Green,
2008; see also Schleifer, 2013).
In sum, our comparison of transnational regulation
on sustainable resource use and climate change illus-
trates that regulatory structure matters. Even fields that
share a common issue area—environmental politics—
may thus respond to different legitimation norms. While
the transnational regulation of sustainable wood, fish,
palm oil or soy occurs in the absence of intergovernmen-
tal framework regulations, transnational climate regula-
tion is strongly influenced by the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol. As the goals of private regulatory initiatives res-
onate with internationally agreed goals, principles or in-
struments, the need to justify the ‘right to regulate’ is a dif-
ferent one for transnational climate governance. We can
call this the state prerogative in legitimating transbound-
ary regulation. In short, the state prerogative implies that,
where (inter-)state regulation is in place, private regula-
tion primarily legitimates itself in relation to the goals,
principles and instruments of public regulation. In con-
trast, where (inter-)state regulation is largely absent, a
‘residual’ right to regulate needs to be defended. In such
cases, democratic legitimation norms become central.
To some extent, this observation can also help explain
why the legitimation of transnational sustainability regu-
lation differs from the legitimation of labour rights stan-
dards. In the former, international law is weaker so that
the FSC and its allies can be seen as genuine law-makers;
in the latter, international human rights law serves as
a strong background, and standard-setters like the Fair
Wear Foundation are seen not as making, but as imple-
menting law by way of applying it to producers. Yet, rel-
evant contexts include not only regulatory, but also nor-
mative structures in the policy field in question. The fair
trade movement, for example, does not rely much on
democratic legitimation, but rather on substantive argu-
ments about the normative adequacy of its principles
even though it is not embedded in an intergovernmen-
tal regime from which it could more or less directly de-
rive its goals or principles. So field-specific legitimation
cultures are likely to play a role, too. In this context, envi-
ronmental governance is sometimes considered to have
a more ‘participatory’ culture than other areas like finan-
cial or economic governance (Bernstein, 2011, p. 42), al-
though issue-framing as ‘technical’ versus ‘political’ may
cut across this simple division. For example, governing
chemical substances or the safety of nuclear power plants
can be seen as environmental policy issues that, com-
pared to conservation governance, follow a relatively
strong ‘technical’ framing. As a result, the legitimation of
industry self-regulation cases like Responsible Care or the
World Association of Nuclear Operators—both under a
strong shadow of state regulation—relies almost entirely
on technical expertise (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000).
Existing research on private governance through rat-
ing agencies, accounting standards or information tech-
nology standards seems to confirm that the reliance on a
strong democratic legitimation narrative is not a general,
but rather a field-specific phenomenon (see e.g. Black,
2008; Botzem, 2012; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Dobusch
& Quack, 2013; Kerwer, 2005). Norms of transparency
and accountability also play a role in these areas, and
the problem of defining stakeholder categories seems, at
least occasionally, to also prompt organizations in ‘tech-
nical’ issue areas to justify their decisions not only in
terms of expertise but also of (some variant of) the all-
affected principle. But if we consider that even in the
highly politicized areas of fair trade and labour standards,
non-democratic criteria—notably just outcomes and re-
spect for human rights—constitute the primary sources
of legitimation, this lends support to the idea that field-
specific cultures are central. In the end, our very rough
survey thus suggests that, all else being equal, demo-
cratic legitimation narratives will be strongest where
standard-setters operate in areas that are not already
regulated by states, that are characterized by a ‘participa-
tory legitimation culture’, and that are dominated by ’po-
litical frames’. In contrast, we should expect democratic
legitimation narratives to be less central in fields where
states provide a regulatory framework, where legitima-
tion cultures are less participatory and where issues are
framed mostly in ‘technical’ terms.
3. Conclusion
There are two take-home messages from this discussion.
First, private transnational sustainability governance
made its initial mark in global governance by successfully
claiming that its decision-making procedures were based
on ‘democratic’ or ‘democracy-like’ foundations—a claim
that seems to have become less central as the field be-
camemoremature, more well-known, andmore densely
populated. This observation confirms the theoretical idea
that organizational fields are dynamic and that some im-
portant lessons we may have learned about them in the
past may have become outdated in the present. More
precisely, private governance could initially only become
legitimate if it could demonstrate its democratic creden-
tials. But that does not necessarily mean that its demo-
cratic foundation remains as relevant in future develop-
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ment stages of the organizational field. In contrast, the ar-
gument I have presented suggests that field recognition
decreased the demand for democratic legitimation.
Second, private transnational sustainability gover-
nance has expanded from its ‘ecological niche’ (Abbott,
Green, & Keohane, 2016) in areas in which states had
long been unable to agree on substantive rules to areas
in which intergovernmental rules are strong. In these ar-
eas, private transnational regulators function not as law-
makers but as implementing agencies that put interna-
tional public law to work. But serving a different function
also implies that the legitimation of private governance
differs in these areas. This second observation essentially
confirms what Edward Balleisen observes for the domes-
tic context, namely that ‘state strength’ is a key variable
for explaining the form private self-regulation takes as
well as the legitimation norms such regulation tends to
be founded upon (Balleisen, 2009). For the case I have
discussed in this article, it means that the ‘state preroga-
tive’ provides a second context in which the demand for
democratic legitimation is reduced.
In the larger scheme of things, the normative impli-
cations of the observations I make in this article are diffi-
cult to judge. In one way, the rise of private transnational
governance in the 1990s ushered in a period of ‘demo-
cratic experimentalism’, and the liability of newness that
forced the first movers to make strong arguments about
why they should be allowed to regulate ‘for the rest
of us’ made exciting projects like the FSC and later the
ISEAL Alliance possible. The institutionalization, profes-
sionalization and bureaucratization that came with the
evolution of private governance into a more common
and more widely recognized pillar of global governance
took away some of this excitement. As a result, global
democrats will need to think hard about whether private
global governance is a project in which they wish to in-
vest further hopes. In another way, however, the state
prerogative could also be read as good news. It ensures
that where governments—many of them democratically
elected—can agree on substantive rules for which there
is a strong demand, these rules are likely to guide the
activities of the more experimental, more flexible and of-
ten also more innovative private regulators. This would
suggest a division of labor along the lines of a ‘principled
pragmatism’ (Ruggie, 2013; see also Abbott, 2012b) in
which public regulators set the broad goals and private
regulators seek diverse ways of making the achievement
of these goals possible. Eventually, the ‘shadow of hier-
archy’ (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008) that such a division
of labour allows for could even become a co-benefit for
resolving a further normative challenge, namely the risk
of greenwashing to which critics of private transnational
self-regulation frequently point.
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